[Electionteam] (veeified) vote by mail fraud in Los Angeles

[robin gibson]

Justin,
Much more simple would to stop the mass VBMail! The voters who were cheated
of their votes did not know they were being cheated. It was only after
hundreds of people worked together for weeks that we found it out. Every
method we used to analyze is now non-available. There are no paper
pollbooks to look at. Access to voter registration became difficult within
a week after my friend mentioned publicly what we found. The registrar made
it expensive for a voter to obtain his/her registration info. The public
got angry. Then the Registrar shredded all of the voter registration
documents and converted them all to electronic files. The law makes access
much more difficult when you are not dealing with paper. All of the
evidence of the fraud we found has been eliminated.
As for digital signatures, I have never made one which actually looks like
my signature. There are multiple reasons to maintain paper. Transparency is
the first of them. We could detect forgeries quickly and easily with paper
documents. I don't believe that digital signatures are as easily compared.
It is also fairly simple to exchange one digital doc for another. That is
what I meant. Comparing the digital signature from election day to the
original signature made on paper is just not as accurate as paper to paper.
The pens we sign with digitally are thicker. I am not a professional in
signature matching, but we did not need one with paper signatures. There
was not any doubt.

On Thu, Dec 1, 2022 at 1:28 PM Justin LeBlanc <justin.r.leblanc at hotmail.com>
wrote:

> Quote:
> "The person who switched all of these voters to VBM, did not even try to
> copy their handwriting. They simply signed all of the voter changes in one
> signature repeated over and over."
>
> You are asserting verified mass forgery in two steps
>
>    - change of ballot casting method (only one allowed because only one
>    ballot accepted) for the voter
>       - without knowledge of voter and in likely non-alignment to their
>       actual actions
>    - counting of ballots submitted by the method changed to
>       - with the source at least unspecified if not unknown
>
> The first part is consistent with other reports over the years, especially
> in the 2016 Presidential Primary Election for the Democrat Party (where
> risk of winner acceptance was at stake).
>
> The relative numbers (such as percentage of total votes tallied) for the
> second part are not well documented, so if you have them, I encourage you
> to express them and submit your documentation to Ray or his lawyer for
> admission to the body of evidence.
>
> This "bypass" should not be possible, but mitigation against it requires
> getting beyond the (currently normative) lazy thinking that multiple ballot
> submissions by the same voter can (and should) reasonably be prevented in
> the context of
>
>    - separate books at each precinct/voting center,
>    - "official" envelopes that are reproducible
>    - insiders being able to bypass both layers
>
> Here is a more realistic protocol:
>
>    - No tally is done until after a 'cool off' period of three days after
>    polling station/postmark deadline--to allow the mail transit to complete
>    and voters to review submission record
>       - Exit polls also cannot be released until after official tally is
>       complete
>    - Mark all ballot envelopes received, as a 'submission' record with a
>    uuid and timestamp, and do not separate any from their ballots immediately,
>    rather filter by rules below
>    - Immediately post all submissions to an internet-accessible (with ID
>    info and security personal answer) portal, just like document changes in
>    everyday office software
>       - *Allows voter to review submissions to detect ones made by
>       someone other than self, and confirm the related ID attempts as forgeries*
>    - Set aside envelopes that are incomplete or
>    multiple-from-same-voter-in-a-day or likely forgeries (as determined by
>    quality ID documentation--such as personal signature/mark--verification)
>       - Notify the voter and allow for cure
>    - The cured submission (or if not needed, default to last submitted)
>    ballot is used for tally
>       - *gives voter ability to change mind/fix errors up until the
>       deadline *
>          - Cannot allow choice of submission after-the-fact on the
>          internet portal, because portal can be hacked
>          - at the risk of mail/precinct not arriving in sequence of
>          submission
>             - which is minuscule unless the voter is weird enough to do a
>             mail-in shortly before one cast in person
>          - Once tally is complete, associate suspected forged envelopes
>    and the ballots inside
>       - NOTE: this will be attacked as violating anonymous ballot rules,
>       but it is not, because what has actually been identified is something other
>       than the registered voter
>       - Add to a table of forgeries, and use that table to establish a
>       pattern of contest selection preferences so as to identify likely fraud
>       sources
>       - *The mere knowledge of suspicious ID documentation and source
>       analysis will make swap out tactics risky to try as likely traceable*
>    - *Tallied ballots will never exceed registered voters, as the chain
>    of custody above will ensure no ballot is included that was not from an
>    unverified envelope (any violation of this would be immediately
>    identifiable as insider source, and an insider would not desire a criminal
>    record)*
>
>
> Quote:
> "Digital signature matching is rather ridiculous unless specialists are
> hired, which is not the case."
>
> What is not oft discussed on this list is signature matching protocol; are
> you asserting that comparing digitized signatures has more failure modes
> than wet ink ones? Beyond just copy-paste of an extant signature (which
> should be quickly caught by initial computer comparison, as human
> handwriting samples aren't ever exactly the same dot-by-dot), of course.
>
>
>
>
> *Justin LeBlanc*
> Email: justin.r.leblanc at hotmail.com
> Mobile: 530-919-3233
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Electionteam <electionteam-bounces at citizensoversight.org> on
> behalf of robin gibson <robingibson10 at gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, December 1, 2022 8:47 AM
> *To:* Ray Lutz <raylutz at citizensoversight.org>; Citizens Oversight **ET
> CA <ElectionTeam at citizensoversight.org>
> *Subject:* [Electionteam] vote by mail fraud in Los Angeles
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Ray, Any conversation about vote-by-mail fraud should include a
> conversation with Bev Harris, who found it all across the country many
> years ago. What she had not yet found in 2008 was HOW it was perpetrated.
> We found that here in LA.  Another person is Gentry Lange who's an EI
> activist who ran for Secretary of State in Washington, an all VBM State.
>
> I can personally attest to it in Los Angeles County in 2008. It has
> nothing to do with the 2000 mules hypothesis, but everything to do with the
> Registrar's office in the County of Los Angeles.
>
> I can attest: A group of some 200 volunteers were present at the polls as
> observers, and helping voters who were unable to vote for various reasons.
> Some of us also held a call center, at a home, to help voters who had
> difficulty voting, report problems to the Registrar's office, etc.
>
> After the election, we had a large amount of data from polling places
> across the county. We were not looking for vote-by-mail fraud, but we
> certainly found it.
>
> The main issue the volunteers came across on election day was a huge
> number of voters who could not vote at their precincts and voted
> provisionally. Those provisional vote issues were not equally spread across
> the county, but concentrated more in some precincts.
>
> We took the 7 precincts with the most voting problems, and analyzed them.
> Seven was the number because of the cost of obtaining materials (poll
> books, etc.) from the Registrar's office, and the number of people/"woman
> hours" we had.
>
> It took some time, as we ordered documents which raised questions, ordered
> more documents, which raised more questions, etc.
>
> The number one reason people were forced to vote provisionally at their
> precincts was that a VBM had been handwritten next to their names in the
> pollbooks. None of them had requested or received VBM ballots. In fact, The
> Democratic party in LA County, and perhaps across the state (chime in
> please CA Ep advocates) was pushing VBm hard even back then, and earlier.
>
>  I remember my shock that instead of the official documents used to change
> an address or party affiliation, which were signed under penalty of
> perjury, piles and piles of half sheets of letter sized paper, on which the
> switch to VBM was xeroxed, were available in the registrar's office and
> given to anyone interested (groups who were registering voters, for
> example).  Any other change to voter registration required official forms
> and a signature under oath.
>
> Anyone was permitted to xerox as many copies as they wanted to, fill these
> out and mail to the Registrar or drop off. As we later found out, no
> signature checks were done. The documents needed to change address or party
> were serious official documents. These were not.
>
> When we eventually obtained the documents switching the voters to VBM,
> they had all been filled out by the same hand. We spoke with the voters
> from these precincts, and were permitted by some to obtain copies of their
> registration documents at the registrar's office, and the documents
> switching them to VBM (which were forgeries).
>
> The number of voters for whom we obtained all documents was small because
> of the time it took us to find out what was happening here. It was 2 months
> after the election when we understood. Most of these voters were Latino,
> and/or independents.
>
> But here is the shocker. In some cases, the provisional ballots cast by
> the voters were not counted. The votebymail ballots were. I prefer to be
> quiet about how we confirmed that. Those of you who have done any in depth
> work already know.
>
> And, unfortunately a local advocate mentioned what we found before we were
> ready to go public with the information. (We were working with Bev, using
> her methods, including working quietly.) A local advocate spoke out about
> our findings, and all of the documents we had used to find the fraud were
> converted to digital documents, so that they could no longer be obtained in
> the future, by our Registrar.
>
> This is one of the reasons it is SO very important to return to paper poll
> books and voter registration!  Digital signature matching is rather
> ridiculous unless specialists are hired, which is not the case. The person
> who switched all of these voters to VBM, did not even try to copy their
> handwriting. They simply signed all of the voter changes in one signature
> repeated over and over.
>
> I assume, because there were so many, all done by one person, that this
> was done from inside the Registrar's office. had it not been, it would have
> been found out by the workers staffing the voter registration office who
> are, or were, very serious election personnel. This is not new.
>
> The strong push for vbm by the d party started well before 2008, and was
> in full swing in 2008. As for Ray's question, re how to determine who gets
> to vote by mail; that is simple. It was fine before this push for VBM.
> Anyone with physical mobility issues or who can not be present on election
> day should be permitted to VBm. That is all. A note from a healthcare
> provider or proof of a journey would suffice.
>
>
>
>
>
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